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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICKY ALLEN TUELLER, 
Case No. 99-0820 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
After Tueller filed his initial opening brief of appellant, the State notified 
appellate counsel for Tueller that the record of the proceedings was incomplete, in 
failing to reflect that trial counsel moved for a mistrial after the court, in front of the 
jury, chastised Tueller for committing perjury and for signaling to his son during his 
son's testimony. 
Appellate counsel has since received a supplemental transcript and files this 
brief to address trial counsel's motion for a mistrial. 
This brief also addresses the preservation of the claim of insufficient evidence, 
because since the opening brief was filed, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated 
that counsel must raise insufficient evidence in the trial court. See State v. Holgate. 
2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 (generally, parties must raise insufficiency in the trial 
court). 
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I. 
THE MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL CONFIRMS 
THE TRJAL COURT'S LACK OF JMPARTJALJTY. 
The supplemental transcript reflects that after the trial court assailed Tueller 
for his perjury and for giving signals to his son during his son's testimony, and 
directed trial counsel to go out and speak with Tueller, trial counsel approached the 
bench and attempted to move for a mistrial during a bench conference, during which 
the trial court repeatedly interrupted and implicitly threatened trial counsel (T. 417a-
417c). The supplemental transcript states in full at this juncture, 
Mr. Becker: With all due respect to the Court, I think that there's 
- I'm going to ask for a mistrial. I think that there's -
The Court: Good. Go ahead. And then we7/ excuse the jury and 
I'm going to have to say some things, too, (inaudible) Your client's over 
there making hand gestures -
Mr. Becker: Okay. But I don't know (inaudible) 
The Court: I've had - I've had perjury in my presence -
Mr. Becker: I understand. 
The Court: And it's (inaudible) the Court, I've got some grave 
questions for you, Counsel. 
Mr. Becker: Your Honor, I had no idea, I would never have asked 
those questions (inaudible) I - I appreciate your situation. I — I 
certainly never suborned perjury in any (inaudible) I have no idea what 
was actually going to (inaudible) 
The Court: I'd like to say to you, Counsel, it's your client -
Mr. Becker: I understand that. 
The Court: -that has committed acts of perjury (inaudible) in my 
presence, committed acts of contempt in my presence and now is 
engaging in witness intimidation openly and blatantly. I don't have an 
obligation to stop that? 
Mr. Becker: (Inaudible) 
The Court: Or do I not -
Mr. Becker: (Inaudible) presence of the jury, so we can do - I 
mean, I—I—I'm in a situation I've never encountered before. I—I'm at a 
loss as to what to do. 
2 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Becker: I- I'm not going to answer-1 mean, I don't know how 
to handle (inaudible) 
The Court: (Inaudible) the situation; right? Okay. 
(Supplemental Transcript at 417a-417c). 
Trial counsel was undoubtedly correct in moving for a mistrial, because 
anytime a trial judge is not impartial, this constitutes structural error requiring a new 
trial. See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that some errors are not subject to harmless error 
review, because they do not merely affect the evidentiary balance of a case, but 
affect the overall framework of a trial, and the trial itself from start to finish. See. 
e.g.. Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). Such errors are 
"necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate," see Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 
275, 282 (1993), and thus do not lend themselves to an evidence-based harmless 
error analysis. 
Structural errors involve "basic protections," in the absence of which "a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt 
or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." 
Fulminante. at 307-09. 
Examples of "structural errors" include the racially discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges, Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), illegal exclusion 
of members of defendant's race from the grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillerv. 474 U.S. 
3 
254 (1986), erroneous instructions on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
proof, Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and deprivation of the rights to 
represent oneself, to counsel, to a public trial, and to an impartial judge, 
see Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279 at 309-10. 
To the extent that trial counsel did not persevere in seeking a mistrial in the 
face of the trial court's anger and implied threats, it appears that making the motion 
in the first place was all that was required under Utah law. See, e.g.. State v. 
Nelson. 950 P.2d 940 (Ut. App. 1997)(rejecting State's waiver argument, where trial 
counsel made proper request for findings and was prepared to challenge eyewitness 
identification, and stating "We will not require defendant to challenge the trial court's 
determination again after making its ruling."); and State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1985)((in addressing the merits of a severance issue, the Court indicated that 
when motions are filed in writing prior to trial, in compliance with Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12, there is no need to make exception to the ruling or to renew 
it at trial). 
Tueller maintains that to the extent that the issues were not fully articulated 
in the trial court, the trial court had a duty to recuse himself, and this Court may 
address the issue under the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrines. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 36-38. 
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II. 
THE SUFFICIENCY CLAIM WAS PRESERVED. 
Since the filing of the opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court decided State 
v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346, which holds that generally, criminal defendants 
must raise insufficiency of the evidence in the trial court. 
In this case, at the close of the State's case, it was unnecessary for trial 
counsel to formally move for dismissal, because as soon as the jury was excused, 
the trial court took it upon himself to encourage the prosecution and the defense to 
consider a lesser included offense instruction (T. T. 290-99), and in so doing, 
indicated that the prosecutor had presented a sufficient case (T. 291). 
Because the trial court had and took the opportunity to rule on the sufficiency 
of the evidence (T. 291), the issue is preserved. See Holgate. 10 P.3d at fl 11 
(preservation rule will give trial courts opportunity to rule on issue, will discourage 
defense counsel from abstaining from raising issue in hopes of planting error). 
See also, e.g.. State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App. 106, at ^  9 n.4, 999 P.2d 1252,1255 
(party may raise insufficiency in the absence of a motion in the trial court if trial court 
ruled on the issue). 
Assuming that the issue is not considered preserved, on the facts of this case, 
the error was a plain one1 which should have been raised by counsel, and counsel's 
1
 The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and 
harmful error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, 
although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error 
occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial 
5 
behavior was objectively deficient and prejudicial in failing to assert this fundamental 
issue on behalf of Tueller.2 
Under Holaate. to prevail in raising insufficiency in the absence of preservation 
under the plain error doctrine, an appellant must demonstrate an obvious and 
fundamental lack of evidence which should have been plain to the trial court. See id. 
The lack of evidence to sustain the charge was apparent to the trial court, who 
immediately began maneuvering the parties toward a lesser included offense 
instruction as soon as the State's case was completed (T. 290-99), and trial 
counsel's failure to pursue dismissal was prejudicial because there is a reasonable 
likelihood that Tueller would not stand convicted of this felony offense had trial 
counsel asserted his rights. 
On the merits, Tueller reasserts the insufficiency argument appearing at pages 
40 through 47 of his Opening Brief of Appellant. 
court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied. 
493 U.S. 814(1989). 
2
 This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires Tueller to 
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable 
standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was 
prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied 
513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability of a different result in the 
absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e.g. State v. Lovell. 758 
P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
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DATED this IP- day of March, 2001. 
-^TEfrlEN R. IvTCCAUGHEY 
Counsel for Mr. Tueller 
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